

Assessment Report of the Dialogue Initiative

Organized by the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation in partnership with
Centre for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

Submitted by
Dr. Pradeep Peiris

Submitted to
**UNDP
Sri Lanka**

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1. Introduction

For years Sri Lanka has been struggling to reconcile the communities that have been affected by long years of conflict. Especially since the end of direct armed confrontation between the LTTE and government security forces, reconciliation has become the center of focus of the government, civil society, and international community. The regime change in 2015 opened up more space for building relations between warring communities and led to many initiatives by the government and the civil society geared towards achieving reconciliation in Sri Lanka. On the one hand, the government has attempted to reform its own institutions and draft a new constitution, while on the other there has been a myriad of initiatives by various civil society partners in the country. The Dialogue Initiative of the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) in collaboration with the Centre for Peace Building and Reconciliation (CPBR) is unique in the sense that it is perhaps the first initiative to combine these two strands of effort.

As much as institutional reforms matter, dialogue initiatives also play a very important role in facilitating the process of finding justice and peace in Sri Lanka. While institutional reforms address the structural and institutional causes of conflict, dialogues are important in influencing the superstructure in our society. Achieving peace will prove to be an enormously challenging task in the absence of any attempt to address the false consciousness prevalent in society. Therefore, one needs to recognize the importance of this initiative by ONUR and CPBR. As it was a pilot project, this study assessed the outcome and process of this Dialogue Initiative in order to learn lessons and to explore the viability of expansion of the project to a larger scale.

This report presents the research framework of the evaluation employed by the consultative-evaluation team which is as follows: i) the scope of the evaluation, ii) the consultant's understanding of the Dialogue Initiative, iii) the evaluation framework and broader questions that this evaluation focused on iv) the methodology adopted to address the main objective of this evaluation v) a comparison between the proposed and actual process of the Dialogue Initiative vi) an assessment of the efficiency of the Dialogue Initiative vii) an assessment of the impact of the Dialogue Initiative and viii) recommendations.

1.1. Scope of the Evaluation

Concisely put, the scope of this evaluation was to consider the logic, process, nature of institutions involved, and outcome/s of the Dialogue Initiative from the point of view of the designers, implementers, and beneficiaries. Drawing information from these three sources has served purposes of triangulation, and the findings are expected to inform the UNDP of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Dialogue Initiative and scope for scalability.

This evaluation aims to provide an independent evidence-based analysis of the Dialogue Initiative implemented to-date, in terms of the accomplishment of its set objectives as specified in the documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation began with an intensive desk-research based on the reports and other documentation produced by the project partners of the Dialogue Initiative. In addition, the evaluation team met with the core members of UNDP, ONUR, and CPBR their district partners, and beneficiaries to acquire a closer view and better understanding of the implementation of the project. Based on the desk research and initial meetings with the project implementing staff, the evaluation team designed an evaluation methodology.

1.2. Understanding of the Dialogue Initiative

This section attempts to present the evaluation team's understanding of the Dialogue Initiative that has been implemented as a result of the joint effort of UNDP, ONUR, and CPBR. This understanding has been mainly derived from the documents made available to the evaluation team (please see annex) and the discussions held with the key stakeholders of the Dialogue Initiative namely UNDP, ONUR, CPBR, Trainers, and participants of the Initiative.

1.3. Objectives

The overall purpose of this Initiative is to strengthen and develop physical and human infrastructure at the Divisional Secretariat level enabling key stakeholders (i.e. government officers, religious leaders, and community leaders) to design and implement a national level reconciliation initiative in Sri Lanka.


The specific objectives include:

- Developing a cadre of trainers and equip them with knowledge and skills to promote reconciliation and conflict transformation, who will work closely with Divisional Secretariats to create a discourse on reconciliation among government officials and communities
- Facilitating the design and implementation of action-oriented programmes on reconciliation among government officials and communities who are regional stakeholders
- Jointly designing a reconciliation model to be considered for country-wide implementation based on the experiences of the pilot programme

(RRI Process Presentation for Launch, 2016; Quarterly Report RRI January-March 2016)


The following diagram represents our understanding of the conceptual framework of the Initiative:

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the Dialogue Initiative



The following map indicates the locations in which the Initiative was carried out viz. Anuradhapura, Jaffna, and Ratnapura. The main reason for selecting Anuradhapura and Jaffna was that they are predominantly mono-ethnic districts which accommodate the two main ethnicities that were engaged in the ethnic conflict. Ratnapura was selected as a multi-ethnic district.

Figure 2: Locations of the Dialogue Initiative



District Population by Ethnicity (%)

	Sinhalese	Sri Lanka Tamil	Indian Tamil	Sri Lanka Moor	Others
Jaffna	0.4	98.9	0.3	0.4	0.0
Anuradhapura	91.0	0.5	0.1	8.2	0.2
Ratnapura	87.1	5.0	5.7	2.1	0.1

Source: Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing, 2011

1.4. Evaluation Framework

This evaluation was conducted using three research pathways to capture the nuances of the project: (i) A series of in-depth interviews with senior ONUR coordinators, senior CPBR coordinators and district coordinators, UNDP's relevant project directors and managers, district and divisional secretariat level senior bureaucrats, trainers and participants, and beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (ii) Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries of the programme and (iii) A survey among direct and extended beneficiaries of the programme.

Through this pluralist research approach, the evaluation attempts to provide an independent analysis of the Dialogue Initiative implemented to-date, in order to assess the achievement of results and to draw lessons that can inform its proposed expansion to other districts. Assessment tools for the Dialogue Initiative outputs were developed based on the activities implemented during the programme. The evaluation team also used a broader theoretical framework guided by the discourses on reconciliation, peace building, and conflict resolution to assess the achievements in relation to project outcomes.

In essence, using a mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative research, this evaluation attempted to address the following broad questions:

- 1) What has been the relevance and effectiveness of this pilot initiative that ONUR and CPBR have jointly undertaken to promote social cohesion and reconciliation at the community level?
- 2) How efficient has the Initiative been in terms of implementing planned activities?
- 3) What recommendations can be made to improve the aspects of design and implementation if this Initiative is to be expanded to other districts?

In order to explore the broader question above, this evaluation inquired into the Dialogue Initiative along the following sub-questions:

1. How was the pilot initiative developed, and what were the operational challenges?

2. What were the strengths and weaknesses that the project experienced due to the decision to involve state structures in implementing the project?
3. What was the assessment of this Initiative by those involved in its development and implementation?
4. How did the participants assess the Initiative, its relevance and effectiveness in preventing conflict, and promoting reconciliation amongst diverse social groups?
5. Have the trained facilitators been able to effectively translate their learning to practice within their communities?
6. What are the challenges that facilitators and communities face when implementing this Initiative?
7. What has been the response of the communities to this Initiative?
 - a. Is there a change of perception with regard to social cohesion and reconciliation within the identified communities following the workshops?
 - b. Were there differences on the basis of gender, ethnicity and other social stratifications?
8. Based on the findings, how can the events be rated in terms of relevance, effectiveness, and operational success?
9. What are the best practices, lesson learnt, and areas that need improvement?

1.5. Methodology

The evaluation methodology aimed to comprehensively capture the nuances and insights of the Dialogue Initiative. Therefore, this evaluation focused on the partners of the programme (namely UNDP, ONUR, and CPBR), as well as a wide spectrum of other stakeholders such as national coordinators, District and Divisional Secretariat level senior bureaucrats, Trainers and participants, beneficiaries, extended beneficiaries, as well as non-beneficiaries.


As already mentioned, this evaluation used three methodological pathways – A survey, FGDs, and in-depth interviews – to assess the effectiveness of the programme as well as to explore aspects of design and implementation that can be improved when expanding this Initiative to other districts. Due to the sensitivity involved in this kind of Initiative, we believed it is important to employ a methodology that has the capacity to capture the nuances of the project. Not only amongst the average citizen but also amongst the civil society and academia there is a great deal of confusion about the meanings and definitions of themes such as peace building, conflict resolution and

reconciliation. Therefore, researching on such themes is not an easy task and it demands the researcher and/or research team to make an effort to acquire an understanding from the perspectives of designers, implementers, and participants of such initiatives.

We hence conducted a series of interviews (32) with the relevant stakeholders (specified above), in addition to 9 in-depth interview (3 per district) with the ToTs who were participants of these training programmes. In order to limit the cost of the project, the qualitative component of this assessment concentrated only on one Divisional Secretariat Division within each selected district. However, in order to avoid any possibilities of underestimation of the Dialogue Initiative's outputs, the team decided to focus on the DSDs that CPBR – as the implementing partner – considered as the most successful locations. Therefore, in consultation with the CPBR, the team identified Palugaswewa from Anuradhapura, Chankanai from Jaffna, and Balangoda to carry out the evaluation process. In addition to the Divisional Secretariat level, district level officials who were part of the Initiative were also approached for their experience and perspective.

As the quantitative component, a survey amongst 211 individuals was conducted, in which respondents were chosen from 1 DS division within each district. When choosing the sample for the survey, respondents were chosen based mainly on the lists of participants of the echo trainings. However, in the interest of maintaining a diverse sample, the review team attempted to talk to as diverse a group as possible in terms of gender, age, etc. Out of these 211 interviews, a total of 57 interviews were conducted amongst non-participants to use them as a control sample. The review team made use of a self-administered questionnaire for the survey component.

Figure 3: Illustration of the research methodology



2. Implementation

Step 01: Development of the Training Manual

Proposed	Expected to include a methodology of the curriculum for the training and how to improve the facilitation skills of the trainers.
Actual	Main objectives were to promote awareness of reconciliation and groom a pool of Trainers who could serve this purpose at various strata in society. To this end, CPBR developed the training manual with ONUR's input.

Step 02: Selection of Trainers

Proposed	Expected to maintain high standards in selection. Proposed criteria for selection were representation, competence and other factors. Development officers, community leaders and religious leaders were expected to be recruited as these trainers.
Actual	Trainers were recruited through a rigorous and impartial procedure. In the first round applications were called through the GA's office on ONUR's instructions. ONUR contacted the GA offices in the relevant areas, and the GAs entrusted this responsibility to their coordinators who in turn shared the call among their existing networks. But later when applications were received it was realized that the information had not reached certain relevant office-holders who would have benefitted much out of this and who in turn would have benefitted the cause as well (especially the DS office which has grassroots connections), and so a second round was called; a total of around 40-60 applications was received, while only 36 were needed. The phases of the selection process were as follows: A write-up on reconciliation, an impromptu presentation, and an interview. The composition of the final cadre was 3 community leaders (1 per district), 12 religious leaders (4 per district), and 21 officers from DS offices (7 per district). Care was taken to choose no more than one Trainer per DS division. While altogether 36 were recruited, during the course of the project some dropped out and at present only 22

remain.¹ Drop outs were due to personal and attitudinal issues. There were instances where officials from the GA office were selected, which were seen as a strength by CPBR because they yield influence over DS officials. Out of the originally envisaged 300 echo trainings, around 240-50 were actually conducted. Most of these were for government officials. While 180 community initiatives were planned, around 20-25 have been implemented to date.

Step 03: Gathering with District Level Stakeholders

Proposed	One day gathering for each district was proposed to secure the support of all stakeholders for the Initiative.
Actual	This activity aimed to inform the local administrative body of this Initiative, request their cooperation, and connect the GA and DS levels. Each gathering was attended by around 200 participants. Attendees included CPBR and ONUR staff, GA and his/her staff, DS and his/her staff among others. The success of this gathering has had a clear impact on the implementation of the rest of the project. The evaluation team found that these meetings had achieved varying degrees of success due to numerous reasons. Especially in Anuradhpura, the initial meeting was less than successful due to logistical and coordination issues (this will be discussed later). Therefore, CPBR and ONUR had organized an additional meeting in Giritale that attracted comparatively positive participation of the officials in question. However, compared to Anuradhapura, the gatherings that were held in Jaffna and Ratnapura can be considered as more successful. This success mainly owed to individual rather than institutional factors, where the attitudes of the respective GAs towards this particular project determined how successfully it was implemented.

Step 04: Training of Trainers

Proposed	One 5-day training was proposed to train 36 participants as Trainers. The proposed training was on reconciliation and developing facilitation skills.
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Actual	<p>2 TOTs were conducted; the first one was organized and facilitated by CPBR where all the facilitators were CPBR staff. No facilitator was reportedly hired from outside. Training was designed to go beyond a classroom session and steps were taken to make them aware about reconciliation, groom them into Trainers who could promote dialogue instead of debate, and impart facilitation skills to them. Out of the 21 government officials, all 7 chosen from Jaffna attended, along with 5 from Ratnapura and Anuradhapura each (32 total). As a follow-up to the first TOT, a second 5-day programme was held to share experiences and discuss problems faced in the field in relation to which further training was given. Although these trainings aimed to impart skills on reconciliation and facilitation, our interviews with TOTs suggested that more emphasis was placed on imparting facilitation skills rather than providing them exposure on peace-building. Many of the TOTs mentioned that they participated in these trainings as part of their duty.ⁱⁱ However, many of them spoke very positively of the training they received, and the training has apparently built a strong bond between participants irrespective of the geographical areas they come from and their ethnicities.</p>
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Step 05: Workshop on District Plan

Proposed	<p>A one-day gathering was planned to help Trainers at the district level plan their district level one day programmes.</p>
Actual	<p>Each Trainer was asked to present their game plan before starting work. They were also asked to do two echo-trainings per month (or at least one). However, there had been issues regarding the practical implementation of these initiatives due to some DS officials having political allegiance to the previous regime that clearly advocated Sinhala nationalist policies. Although 'district planning' workshops were held in each district following the TOTs, participation was only limited to Trainers of the respective district and the CPBR coordinators. Further, it must also be noted that CPBR did not have coordinators appointed for all the districts even at the time of the district planning meetings. According to CPBR, this delay in recruiting district coordinators was mainly due to the delay in processing funds on the part of ONUR.</p>

During these district planning meetings, officials of CPBR and Trainers of the respective districts developed an activity plan for the district. However, due to dropouts and various other challenges, it was learnt that the actual implementation hardly followed the proposed plan.

Step 06: Echo Training

Proposed

One day workshops were proposed to impart the training received by Trainers to a larger community in the ground. Each Trainer was expected to do 7 trainings. Participants for these trainings were expected to be DS level officials, police officers, professional groups, Grama Niladaris, youth leaders, and community leaders.

Actual

Trainers conducted these trainings in teams of two in the initial stage. The CPBR also took part in the actual facilitation until the Trainers felt comfortable with conducting the sessions on their own. Towards the latter part some were confident enough to conduct these alone. While ethno-religiously mixed audiences were entertained, care was taken not to mix participants in terms of age and gender. Interpreters were used for linguistically diverse groups. However, the targeted 7 trainings per DS division did not materialize. Against the expected turnout of 25-30 participants, the actual amount ranged between 20-50. CPBR monitored at least the first training in each DS division. Locations and venues were selected by the Trainers who were paid 2500 LKR per training and 15,000 LKR for additional costs related to each training. The trainers in turn settled all bills with the CPBR district coordinator. The agenda of the training was kept flexible to let the situation determine the topic, within the larger framework of the Dialogue. A key challenge was that most Trainers did not carry out their proposed Initiatives due to fear of various factors like a possible BBS backlash and pressure from the previous Rajapaksa regime. CPBR assisted them with this issue by helping them design an agenda. Discussions were done without a thematic structure, maintaining maximum flexibility. According to CPBR coordinators and the Trainers, this flexibility positively contributed to the discussion.ⁱⁱⁱ However, interviews with some of the participants indicated that this lack of a theoretical framework not only failed to give direction to the discussion, but also contributed towards inciting suspicion among some participants.^{iv} Further, this has left the Trainers unequipped to handle questions of the participants.

Step 07: Coaching and Mentoring

Proposed	Coaching and mentoring sessions were planned at the district level to help Trainers with their trainings while further developing their knowledge and skills.
Actual	This was conducted to raise the confidence of Trainers to face the challenges in their respective DS divisions. As an example, the National Integration Officer from 'Nuwaragampalatha central' DS division who was recruited as a Trainer had faced many challenges from his fellow DS officers when conducting his trainings. He had been called a "reconciliation-karaya". ^v In this context coaching and mentoring was viewed as very important to mentally equip them to handle these tasks by getting over their fears and reservations. Trainers met monthly in their districts to review work implemented and plan the next Initiative.


Step 08: Regional Reconciliation Initiatives

Proposed	The project envisaged establishing reconciliation committees at the community level and these committees were expected to be selected from among those who attended the echo training sessions. They were supposed to carry out reconciliation initiatives with the other participants.
Actual	Echo training participants were asked to list down 'practical' initiatives they planned to carry out, and these were then presented to the audience (comprising echo training participants of all 3 districts). The audience decided on 2-3 initiatives that were deemed relevant and feasible and the Trainer appointed a committee of 3-4 members to implement the chosen Initiatives. The role of the Trainer was to facilitate the Initiatives chosen thus. These Initiatives turned out in the main to be workshops and exposure visits. It was noted by CPBR that exposure visits seemed to excite participants more than workshops.

3. Efficiency

The implementation of the Dialogue Initiatives can be presented using the following diagram (figure 3). As depicted in the diagram, the entire process of implementation can be broken down to four levels namely 1) Design and Coordination Level 2) Intermediary Level 3) Grassroots Level and 4) Dialogue Initiatives. ONUR and CPBR played a key role at the design and coordination level. While ONUR gave political legitimacy to the project by connecting it to the state apparatus, CPBR conceptualized the Dialogue Initiative. Once the project was designed, at the Intermediary Level the District Secretariats of Jaffna, Ratnapura, and Anuradhapura were brought into the project. This mechanism further expanded to the grassroots level by connecting with a selected number of Divisional Secretariats within the respective District Secretariat jurisdictions. At this level, a set of Trainers was recruited and trained by CPBR in order to conduct a series of Dialogue Initiatives within the three respective districts. Dialogue Initiatives were conducted among the staff of the District Secretariat, youth in the area, and the community. In this section of the report, the efficiency of project implementation is discussed under each of the above mentioned levels.

Figure 4: Implementation of the Dialogue Initiative



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3.1. Design and Coordination Level

In this section the efficiency of ONUR and CPBR is evaluated in terms of national level design and coordination of the Dialogue Initiative.

Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPBR's use of its own network and expertise as a result of years of work in the field ensured smooth operationalization of the project. • CPBR's past expertise in organizing peace-related discussions made a positive contribution towards designing the project efficiently. For example, its decision to allocate more resources and time for preparatory work clearly indicates their past experience and proficiency in similar work. • The experience and commitment of the Chairperson of ONUR, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaranatunga, provided a significant amount of encouragement and political capital for the project.
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a lack of clarity between partners in terms of funding, work responsibilities, and the future of the project. • ONUR was observed being handicapped by bureaucratic challenges such as payment processing delays. Although ONUR enjoys state power and state legitimacy, it also suffered in this project due to state bureaucracy and the internal politics inherent to it. • It appeared that for the ONUR team (except the Chairperson) this seems to be more of an implementation task than a political one. Therefore, they failed to provide political leadership to the Initiative. • ONUR's capacity continues to be challenged due to the lack of necessary human resources. • ONUR's effort in coordinating with the bureaucracy was undermined at various levels due to the lack of clarity among government servants on ONUR's mandate and powers.

Both ONUR and CPBR brought in significant advantages to the Initiative. The leadership of former President Kumaranatunga can be viewed as one of the biggest plus points for the project in terms of efficiency. ONUR's status as a state institution could technically have afforded more legitimacy among the people, as well as access to the vast bureaucratic network. In addition, having on board an organization such as CPBR whose network and past experience are both extensive can also be considered as a strength of this Initiative. However, the evaluation team failed to notice a well-thought-out designing process with the participation of the two main partners and other intellectuals before the Initiative was finalized. It is the evaluation team's observation that this Dialogue Initiative was the result of a combination of two separate pre-existing initiatives of the two main partners, rather than a single programme that envisions a single outcome. For example, ONUR seems to be conceptualizing a project to deal with the politics of peace, while CPBR seems to be paying more attention to individual change as a means of bringing about societal change. Therefore, it does not seem that the two organizations expect to achieve the same outcome despite the expectation of both to contribute to reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Further, the strength of ONUR – its Chairperson and it being a government entity – at times has proven also to be its weakness. Bureaucrats are inherently statist. Hence expecting them to intervene in an issue that has resulted in an ethnic conflict (due to state formation drawbacks in Sri Lanka) might be somewhat ambitious. In addition, government servants extend their loyalty and allegiance to state power more than to an institution like ONUR that is not perceived as part of the state apparatus.

3.2. Intermediate Level

In this section the efficiency of the District Secretariat staff, ONUR and CPBR is evaluated in terms of intermediate level coordination and implementation of the Dialogue Initiative.

Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of government institutions with a high level of legitimacy (such as the DS Office) to implement the project has secured greater public participation. • The decision to involve National Integration Officers, an already defined job category, at the DS office in this Initiative needs to be commended. On the one hand, this Initiative has provided a job description for these cadres who thus far only had the position but not the job description. On the other, providing them training in and exposure to reconciliation work would result in the sustainability of this endeavour even beyond this Dialogue Initiative. • That some government officials were able to use the Dialogue Initiative for their own projects in their respective districts is indicative of how this initiative has been internalized by said officials. • This Dialogue Initiative seems to be compliant with the government's popular rhetoric. Hence, this initiative has managed to secure relatively high support and less resistance from government officials. • In some District Secretariats, in their monthly progress reviews, the progress of the Dialogue Initiative was reviewed as well.^{vi} This shows the extent to which the Dialogue Initiative was accommodated by higher officials. • The fact that CPBR and ONUR ventured into fixing the failed Anuradhapura district gathering with an additional workshop later in Giritala exhibits active engagement on the part of the implementers of this initiative.
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the local level government officials showed interest in delivering material goods to their communities rather than delivering ideological products such as this Dialogue Initiative. Therefore, many viewed this Initiative as a harbinger of future material assistance.^{vii} • Due to inadequate engagement with higher officials at the district level (stemming from a lack of time and resources), this Initiative failed to receive their fullest support. • Due to the contradictions between the ideological foundation of this Initiative and the

personal ideological positions of some higher officials at the district level, the official backing this Initiative received clearly lacked genuine commitment.

- The strategy of using the office that was deployed to realize the interests of the Sinhala nationalist project a few years ago for this Initiative that is primarily founded on the opposite ideology has hindered the efficiency of the project.
- Although President Kumaranatunga brought in a significant amount of strength to the Initiative, the fact that government officials do not perceive her as a power centre – or a person at the top of the line of command of government servants – undermines ONUR’s capacity to efficiently coordinate government officials.

In order to understand what made this strategy efficient or inefficient, one must examine how local government officials function. These officials are not only subject to politics, but are also agents of politics. Therefore, their action or inaction, their interests and objections, and their aspirations and fears can only be comprehended by examining the political context within which they practice their day to day duties. While recognizing the strength that the massive government network brought into the Initiative, one must not ignore the complexities and challenges produced by this cohabitation. Generally, state officials are ideologically statist. Their top priority is to deliver services and goods among communities using all the resources available to them. They often claim to be a-political and a-ideological as loyal government servants. However, in reality they are not. During the past ten years of Rajapaksa regime they have been instrumental in the regime’s Sinhala nationalist project. Some of the current young officials were recruited during this time. As the evaluation team witnessed during its field work, the majority of Sinhala officials either openly express their agreement with the previous regime’s ideology, or at least are careful to not criticize it. Despite their claims that they are for peace, most of the Sinhala officials seem to be unconvinced by the many suggestions proposed by the reconciliation process (such as singing the national anthem in Sinhala and Tamil both, and devolving more powers to Provincial Councils, etc.).^{viii} On the other hand, Tamil officials were careful not to talk about politics, but rather to discuss recovery and reconstruction related to war victims.^{ix} Therefore, the institution that was chosen as the primary mode of delivery showed extremely weak commitment to the ideology and politics this Dialogue Initiative aimed to espouse. Further, political victimization seemed to be a popular concern among these officials. As

they say, the past has taught them enough and more lessons that governments are susceptible to change and they are vulnerable to penalty because of their allegiance to the rival political group. Therefore, irrespective of ethnicity and geography, all government officials exhibit extreme caution in joining ideological projects of a new government, especially one that lacks popular support. In this context, engagement of government officials as messengers of peace building ideals can only be efficient as long as outputs are concerned, not outcomes – which is to say although this assures efficient implementation of Dialogues, it cannot really communicate the intended message and ideals that are necessary to build peace and harmony in this country.

3.3. Grassroots Level

In this section the efficiency of Trainers, Divisional Secretariat staff, and CPBR is evaluated in terms of grassroots level coordination and implementation of the Dialogue Initiatives.

Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Dialogue Initiative has provided opportunities for officials (Trainers) to demonstrate their loyalty and efficiency at work. • The National Integration Officers for the first time have had an opportunity to give true meaning to their designation. • Government officials who worked as Trainers had their performance evaluated at the monthly meetings as part of their staff performance. • CPBR coordinators continued their engagement with the Trainers throughout the project to guide them.
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The commitment of the Trainers is often affected by their fear of possible repercussions in the event of a regime change. • The work of the Trainers has been affected by fellow government officials who were recruited during the previous regime, who have negative perceptions about the reconciliation programme of the new government. • Trainers were also victimized by bureaucratic red-tapism.

The self-administered survey that was conducted among the Dialogue Initiative participants revealed that participants were generally pleased with the Trainers and how they conducted the sessions. For example, as figures 5, 6, and 7 show, 74% of those who participated in the survey conducted by the

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evaluation team said that they had been briefed or they had some idea about the programme before they took part in the Dialogue Initiative. Further, about 60% of the Dialogue participants were of the opinion that the performance of the facilitator was good. Only 9% felt that the performance of the facilitator was bad while 32% of the Dialogue Initiative participants stated that the performance of the facilitator was moderate and can be improved.

Despite many successful Dialogue Initiatives, not all the Trainers managed to implement the full number of dialogue sessions they had initially planned. The discussions with the Trainers in all three districts revealed that factors such as not being fully convinced about this Initiative, fear of political victimization, and bureaucratic hurdles have badly affected the efficacy of the Trainers at the grassroots level.

Figure 5: Were you briefed about the programme before you participated?




Figure 6: Performance of the facilitator





Figure 7: Content of the programme



In addition, especially in the districts of Anuradapura and Ratnapura, the political condition of communities being attuned to Sinhala nationalist narratives posed a challenging environment for the Trainers to organize successful Dialogue Initiative. As Trainers were not provided with an extensive training on peace building, it is doubtful whether those discussions followed the path originally envisioned. This point is somewhat supported by the results of the survey conducted among a sample of the Dialogue participants – these survey participants were chosen by the Trainers themselves as opposed to being a random sample, and therefore the findings of the survey should be treated as the best possible positive result. As shown in Figure 6, only 34% of those who participated in the evaluation survey appreciated the content of the Dialogue Initiative. About half of those who participated in the evaluation survey felt that the content should be improved. Many of the Trainers stated that they mainly focused on facilitating the Dialogue based on what the participants bring up during the session instead of providing them with specific content.^x The Trainers, as learnt during the evaluation field visits, did not seem to have a political position on the nature of the Sri Lankan conflict nor a theoretical framework within which the resolution of the conflict should be addressed. During an in-depth interview with two Dialogue Initiative participants –purposively chosen by the Trainers – in Anuradapura, a question was raised as to why activities such as Dialogue Initiatives are needed in areas where the Sinhala community lives. Those two participants said that they were suspicious of the bona fide of these kinds of initiatives and wondered whether these projects meant to facilitate the reintroduction of the ‘Tamil-Eelam dream’ of the separatists.^{xi} On the contrary, the DS office staff who had participated in the Dialogue Initiative during the in-depth interviews (chosen by the Trainers), stated that these initiatives were very useful and important for the society.^{xii} However, they failed to provide any specific reason as to why such initiatives are useful. The situation in Chankanai DS, Jaffna was very different and according to Trainers and CPBR coordinators those sessions had been very successful. At the evaluation meeting, most of the participants criticized the Sinhala government for the continuous failure to honour its promises to the Tamil people. Many utilized that meeting to highlight their frustration with their state of affairs, and some if they insisted that these kinds of initiatives are relevant for the Sinhala south and not for the Tamil people who were only victims of the conflict.^{xiii} These confusions and contradictions amongst the participants of the Dialogue Initiatives confirm the lack of clarity among the participants on the main objective of the Dialogue Initiatives.

Figure 8: Evaluation of Community Initiatives





Figure 9: Satisfaction with the exposure received to the lives and experiences of other communities



As these Initiatives were implemented in predominantly mono-ethnic areas, despite the representation of many social and cultural groups, participants largely failed to recognize the diversity among them. It is important to note that often people tend to either deny or be silent about the existence of caste based differences in public. As such, many understand diversity in terms of ethnic categories. Therefore, although the main focus of this Initiative was on the 'other', as depicted in figure 9, only 25% seems to be satisfied with the exposure they received to the lives and experiences of other communities.


These Dialogue Initiatives were supposed to culminate in to a series of Regional Reconciliation Initiatives (RRIs) initiated by the Dialogue participants (figure 8 presents the level of satisfaction of participants with these Initiatives). RRIs were identified by both facilitators and participants as the most effective means by which CPBR can intervene in the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Qualitative interviews suggested that the mono-ethnic nature of echo trainings limited their chances to understand the other.^{xiv} Thus, whenever facilitators asked participants to propose a reconciliation initiative, they mostly tended to choose exposure visits to places of worship, areas of residence, and lifestyles in general of the 'other'. FGD participants from Balangoda continuously brought up the fact that being unable to make the initially planned visit to Jaffna was very dissatisfying because it would have been an opportunity for them to obtain the maximum benefit out of the Dialogue Initiatives. However, the high demand for exposure visits from facilitators and participants alike seems to be due to their curiosity about the ways of life of other communities. This curiosity was seen both among participants and non-participants of the Dialogue Initiative. For example, non-participant officers in the Balangoda DS office had expressed their desire to join a proposed visit to Jaffna, which had not materialized due to it being cancelled later on. These non-participants were unhappy about not having joined the Initiative at the initial stage as it would have given them the opportunity to participate in this visit and learn about another culture.^{xv} This points to two possible conclusions: 1) Participants expect a material/recreational outcome from these kinds of initiatives 2) There is an innate curiosity in people to know the 'other'. Hence through these kinds of initiatives people expect to fulfill either or both of these needs.

It is also worth mentioning that although these Initiatives were designed and implemented by the Dialogue participants on their own, these activities seemed to be highly subject to the amount of resources allocated by the Dialogue Initiatives. Therefore, in the absence of the Dialogue Initiative, the chances of such voluntary community initiatives sustaining are slim.

4. Impact

The impact of the Dialogue Initiative is evaluated under the two objectives of the project.

Figure 10: Impact of the Dialogue Initiative in terms of project objectives



4.1. Building a Pool of Cadres

Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Dialogue Initiative was able to attract a committed, skillful group of government officials. • This pool of trainers possesses a commendable level of facilitation skills. • CPBR has managed to link its past projects with the current one; also, the current project is used by CPBR to build potential resources for future projects. • The Dialogue Initiative has triggered an interest among a group of government officials in conflict resolution, while managing to give exposure to a large number of local government officials on conflict resolution.
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The commitment and enthusiasm of Trainers in some instances were the result of career advancement calculations. For instance, participation in reconciliation programmes earns them points that help them climb up in the career ladder. Therefore in the event of a regime change and a subsequent rearrangement of

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government priorities, the sustainability of this effort might suffer.

- Since the training mainly focused on facilitation sans theory and ideology, there is a possibility of these Trainers being used for other activities that could be in contradiction to the spirit of this Initiative.

4.1.1. Positive Impact

One of the clearest achievements of this Initiative is the pool of Trainers that has been produced. Although the total number is limited to about 30 odd individuals, as a result of these Initiatives – especially due to the hard work of CPBR – they exhibit a high degree of dedication and technical know-how as Trainers who can be deployed to moderate and facilitate workshops in the three respective districts. In addition, as a result of their engagement with the Dialogue Initiatives and various training sessions with the CPBR, strong bonds have been developed amongst the members of this pool of Trainers. As young government servants who have to deal with the grassroots, the facilitation skills they acquired under this Initiative would help them to become better servants of the people. In addition, in the event of the government deciding to expand this reconciliation initiative, they – especially National Integration Officers – can play a more critical role in training their colleagues. Due to this Initiative, for the first time, the work of the National Integration Officers has been defined and recognized. Therefore, this training of facilitators has contributed towards many positive outcomes that go well beyond the scope of this Dialogue Initiative.

4.1.2. Negative Impact

Many of the Trainers explicitly and implicitly indicated that they expect their participation in these Initiatives to contribute to their career advancement and a certain amount of recognition within their work space.^{xvi} However, one must not look at this in completely negative terms as it is quite normal for anyone who works at an established formal institution to be concerned about career advancement. Nevertheless, what is troubling here is the tension that these Trainers experience with their colleagues due to the perceived link between career advancement and these kinds of initiatives. This has been highlighted on numerous occasions across all three districts. These Trainers stress the point that political victimization is not a new phenomenon for a government servant, and hence they are vulnerable to being victims of their own good work such as this Initiative.^{xvii} These fears were expressed at the beginning of the Dialogue Initiatives, and some even dropped out after receiving their training. At this last stage, many express fear for their careers in the event of this

project discontinuing. It is also important to understand that their efficiency and productivity is dependent not only upon their capacity and commitment, but also largely on the political context at the national and local levels, as well as within the government bureaucracy.

It is understandable that within a short period of time Trainers cannot be provided with a thorough understanding of the current political context, and the global and national discourse on conflict resolution. However, training only on facilitation skills sans theoretical understanding of conflict and conflict resolution has not only made them vulnerable to the criticism of nationalistic forces, but also has made them into something akin to soldiers who go to war without knowing their enemy. As a result, this training has only produced a group of 'professionals' instead of 'professional activists' who would not only function using scientific methodology, but also with deep rooted conviction. Therefore, approaching these Dialogue Initiatives which are essentially political through non-political means is going to be counter-productive to the objectives of the Initiatives. On the one hand, as already discussed, the inability to engage with politics at the conceptual level has made them defenseless at times when their work is questioned by those who are against the current reconciliation initiative. On the other, this inability to engage with serious questions, and not being able to clearly articulate a political position has made people suspicious of the bona fide of these Initiatives. What is more dangerous about the fact that using a group of facilitators without political commitment is, they can be used not only for reconciliation initiatives of the current regime, but also any initiatives of a future regime that could contradict the spirit of these Dialogue Initiatives. Therefore, despite the excellent training given by CPBR and the current enthusiasm of the team of Trainers, the sustainability of these resources in the long term is questionable.

4.2. Building Grassroots Bases for Reconciliation

Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participants of the Initiative demonstrated greater support for ethnic co-existence than non-participants. • As compared to non-participants, there is greater hope for and expectations of reconciliation among participants; their take on reconciliation is generally more optimistic. • Participants displayed signs of greater accommodation of other ethno-religious lifestyles than non-participants. • The enthusiasm among participants for exposure to other cultures was higher than that among non-participants.
Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was not adequate participation of academics in curriculum design. • While ONUR's accessibility to vast government networks was definitely a plus, the fact that it is spearheaded by former president Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaranatunga brought in a unique set of challenges in terms of political recognition. • Participants in Sinhalese areas were of the opinion that these kinds of programmes should be conducted in areas prone to conflict (such as the Tamil North), and not in ones where there is no history of ethnic violence. Therefore in Ratnapura, it was viewed as having the potential to do more harm than good. • In areas such as Ratnapura, there was less sensitivity to Northern dynamics due to the lack of exposure to the war. In terms of relevance, this posed a problem.

4.2.1. Positive Impact

The survey component of the assessment suggests that the project has made both positive and negative impact in relation to its objectives. The findings suggest that the positive impact of the Initiative can be captured through several dimensions. Thus the positive impact will be discussed in relation to responses to certain normative statements, participants' expectations of reconciliation, their awareness of different ethnic groups, and their enthusiasm for inter-ethnic interaction. In the following diagram, percentages are indicated according to the participants and non-participants who agreed with each of the statements given.

Figure 11: Knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions related to reconciliation





Figure 11 above includes certain negative statements about reconciliation. These statements have enjoyed less currency among the people who participated in the Dialogue Initiative than those who did not. This suggests some kind of positive impact that the Dialogue Initiative has had on the participants. Many of these statements which show a positive impact are statements which indicate their general agreement with certain **normatively accepted notions in society** about ethnic co-existence. For instance, when respondents were asked about whether they felt they were superior than other ethnic categories due to certain characteristics (participants agree – 36%; non-participants agree – 51.1%), whether it is difficult to have a meaningful relationship with members of other religious groups (participants agree – 15.5%; non-participants agree – 37.5%), and the inclination of respondents to not have inter-ethnic marriages (participant agree – 34.3%; non-participant agree – 44.4%), the participants’ responses were more positive than those of non-participants.

Another positive change in participants was that by participating in the Dialogue Initiatives their **negative opinions about reconciliation** had reduced compared to non-participants. For example, when asked to respond to negative statements such as “reconciliation is not necessary; it is something imposed by the West on Sri Lanka” (participants agree – 18.8%; non participants agree – 32.3%) and “reconciliation attempts are not useful because I don’t believe positive relationships can be developed between ethnic communities” (participants agree – 23.7%; non participants agree – 38.5%), agreement is much less among participants than among non-participants.

In terms of **knowledge of other ethno-religious groups**, responses to negative statements such as “I don’t understand why people of different racial/ethnic backgrounds wear clothes that distinguish their identity” (participants agree – 24.2%; non participants agree – 27.9%) and “it is my ethnicity that has a historical right to this country” (participants agree 36.8–%; non participants agree 53.3–%), witnessed much lesser agreement among participants of the Dialogue Initiative than non-participants.

Figure 12: Enthusiasm for receiving exposure to the ethnic 'other'



Both the quantitative and qualitative components suggest an increase of **enthusiasm among participants for experience and exposure to their ethnic 'other'** than non-participants. As figure 12 illustrates, participants had more friends from other ethnicities (85.3%) than non-participants (77.3%). In response to the statement "I seek opportunities to speak with individuals from other ethno-racial backgrounds about their life experiences", more participants stated that they would (77.4%) than non-participants (70.2%).


Upon speaking to some of the respondents it was revealed that although they demonstrated highly positive opinions towards reconciliation, they lacked convincing reasoning for their views. For example, the four government officials the Evaluation Team interviewed in Anuradhapura (who were participants of the Initiative), though they claimed that inter-ethnic harmony is essential and in fact minorities were actually better compared to the majority, they failed to articulate a clear argument as to why they think what they think.^{xviii} Many of the Sinhalese participants of the Dialogue Initiatives who were interviewed for this evaluation stated that communities should be living in peace and harmony as they did before the conflict began.^{xix} This means they expect reconciliation to be achieved by returning to the status quo. This entails not only retrieving lost friendships and relations, but also retrieving and re-establishing ethnic power imbalances that existed (and were accepted) in pre-conflict society. Therefore it is important to highlight the fact that despite their positive attitude towards reconciliation, they still have failed to imagine a future outside of the majoritarian and ethnocentric democratic framework. Participants of the Jaffna Dialogue Initiative too stressed the importance and urgency of reconciliation. However, unlike their Sinhalese counterparts, they emphatically stated that reconciliation should be accompanied by justice for their suffering, reparation for their losses, and re-establishing their dignity. They clearly recognize the Sri Lankan

state and the Sinhalese community as the ones who should bear the main responsibility of bringing forth reconciliation to the country.^{xx}

4.2.2. Negative Impact

The negative impact of this project concerns its inability to challenge the popular understanding of ethnic stereotypes, and create a mindset that accommodates structural changes identified as essential for reconciliation. The way in which reconciliation is viewed by participants of the Dialogue Initiative is extremely complex and often contradictory. Although the Initiative seems to have induced certain positive attitudes among participants across geographical and ethnic divides, these attitudes seem to mainly lie only on the surface level. This fact emerged not only in our qualitative interviews (as discussed in the previous section), but was also reflected in the survey data which are presented below.

Figure 13: Issues concerning ethnic equality



As figure 13 indicates, participants have agreed less than non-participants with serious issues such as singing the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil, and giving constitutional protection to minority groups. This means that the Dialogue Initiative has failed to win participants over in relation to issues with serious political implications, which could be due to the content of the Initiative not handling any such topics that may be perceived as ‘controversial’.

In addition, the findings of the evaluation survey also suggest that the attitude of participants towards living in multi-ethnic communities is not different to the attitudes of non-participants. As shown in figure 14 below, both participants and non-participants expressed a similar view when they were asked how they feel a) when people of different ethnic backgrounds speak their language

around them, and b) when s/he is around a significant number of people who speak a different language. Perhaps the mono-ethnic setting of the Dialogue Initiative did not serve to address this attitude among participants.

Figure 14: Attitude towards living in a multi-ethnic setting





Figure 15: I believe the behaviour of certain ethnic/religious communities is detrimental to reconciliation in the country



As shown in figure 15, when respondents were asked whether the behavior of certain ethnic/religious communities is detrimental to reconciliation in the country, 81.3% of participants answered in the affirmative, as compared to 80.8% of non-participants. This is further corroborated by the qualitative discussions carried out by the evaluation team, whereby Sinhalese suggested conducting similar kinds of initiatives in Tamil areas that are 'more prone to conflict', and Tamils vice versa. Thus, the Dialogue Initiative has not challenged ethnic stereotypes when it comes to commitment to reconciliation.

5. Recommendations

The analysis of this evaluation study has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the Dialogue Initiative implemented with a great amount of financial and human resource investment. As a pilot study, this Initiative provides a wealth of information that can be used well beyond reconciliation projects. Given the complex political (polarized majoritarian and nationalistic politics) and historical (thirty years of protracted war, a zero-sum military victory in 2009, and the Sinhala nationalistic politics of the previous regime) context within the country, whatever achievements made by this Initiative need to be highly commended. The evaluation team concurs with ONUR, CPBR, and UNDP with regards to the importance of these grassroots Dialogue Initiatives and believes that communities have to come together to shred nationalistic myths and to build a shared future that will result in a democratic and pluralist society. Therefore, while fully supporting the continuation of dialogue discussions at the local level, we would like to recommend the following points to be considered in any future initiatives of this kind.

5.1. Engaging the State

- Clear political will and direction are vital for any grassroots level initiative to be successful. Therefore, all efforts should be made to convince the political authority and the high level bureaucracy to provide clear leadership to reconciliation in order to bring in political legitimacy to such grassroots initiatives.
- When engaging state institutions, their role should be mainly focused on infrastructural and policy-related issues that have a significant bearing on reconciliation at the national and local levels.
- It may not be very effective to engage state officials as political activists in politically sensitive issues like reconciliation. The peace activist is not only in need of knowledge on peace building, but also, and more importantly, should believe in democratic values, ethnic pluralism, and tolerance, as well as ready and willing to make sacrifices for the principles they stand for. Therefore, we suggest government servants be given exposure to reconciliation themes that can be incorporated to and reflected in their day-to-day work, instead of trying to use them as peace activists.

- Any attempt at engaging lower level government officials should be made after serious engagement with the relevant senior officials on the subject. It is of paramount importance to address the concerns of the senior officials in question, if not convince them of the subject they are expected to provide leadership to. This needs to be done by recognizing the paradigm within which the bureaucracy functions in the country. Therefore, it needs to be recognized that sheer command would not really result in active commitment to a project like these Dialogue Initiatives.
- In order to assure the clear support of senior bureaucrats, clear political leadership is more important than perks and other incentives. Therefore, in any state initiative to be carried out in collaboration with non-state actors, a coherent line of command should be followed.

5.2. Designing and Implementing Dialogue Initiatives

- Dialogue needs to be conducted not only with the participation of trained facilitators, but also within a particular conceptual framework. Therefore, it is important to come up with the relevant conceptual framework with the participation of academics and practitioners in conflict resolution.
- Although individual transformation is important to achieve a just and fair society, it is highly advisable to look into the community's understanding and its transformation when achieving peace and reconciliation in a society that has experienced a protracted civil war. Therefore, it is important to address myths, beliefs, and claims at the community level when promoting reconciliation for a shared future.
- If a dialogue aims to facilitate understanding and empathy among communities, it is important to have all ethnic groups participate in the dialogue. If the dialogue aims to seek truth and promote compassion, it is important to have participants who have had direct exposure to the conflict as victims or perpetrators. The current Dialogue Initiative was conducted only among people who claimed to be victims. None seemed to associate him/herself with the term 'perpetrator'. Therefore, 'truth' is one-sided and compassion and forgiveness are abstract. In Sri Lanka's conflict nobody claims to be 'perpetrators'. Hence the dialogue format used in South Africa and Central America may not directly be helpful to our

case. We suggest in Sri Lanka, therefore, dialogue discussions be centered on fundamentals of democratic values and the larger question of how to build a just society.

- Dialogue participants should be selected using clearly stated criteria, instead of encouraging the same group of people to participate in dialogues on various things (to avoid ‘professional participants’ who make a living out of participating in workshops).
- We suggest that priority be given to people who can be influential in shaping community opinion (such as teachers, students, local elites, etc.), when selecting participants for dialogues.

ⁱ Interview with CPBR programme officers, Colombo, 6 February, 2017

ⁱⁱ Interviews with Trainers and higher level officials of the Divisional Secretariat, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017; Rathnapura, 2 March, 2017; Chankanai, Jaffna, 9 March, 2017

ⁱⁱⁱ Interview with CPBR programme officers, Colombo, 6 February, 2017; interview with district coordinators, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017; Interview with Trainers, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017

^{iv} Interview with Trainers, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017

^v Interview with CPBR programme officers, Colombo, 6 February, 2017

^{vi} Interview with CPBR programme officers, Colombo, 6 February, 2017

^{vii} Interview with district officials at the Divisional Secretariat, Chankanai, Jaffna, 9 March, 2017

^{viii} Interview with echo training participants, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 23 February, 2017

^{ix} Interview with echo training participants, Chankanai, Jaffna, 10 March, 2017

^x Interview with Trainers, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017; Rathnapura, 2 March, 2017

^{xi} Interview with echo training participants, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017

^{xii} Interview with Trainers, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017; Rathnapura, 2 March, 2017

^{xiii} Interview with echo training participants, Chankanai, Jaffna, 10 March, 2017

^{xiv} Interviews with echo training participants, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 23 February, 2017; Balangoda, Rathnapura, 3 March, 2017

^{xv} Interview with echo training participants, Balangoda, Rathnapura, 3 March, 2017

^{xvi} Interview with Trainers, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017; Interview with higher level officials of the Divisional Secretariat, Balangoda, Rathnapura 2 March, 2017

^{xvii} Interview with Trainers, Chankanai, Jaffna, 9 March, 2017; Interview with higher level officials of the Divisional Secretariat, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 22 February, 2017

^{xviii} Interview with echo training participants, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 23 February, 2017

^{xix} Interviews with echo training participants, Palugaswewa, Anuradhapura, 23 February, 2017; Balangoda, Rathnapura, 3 March, 2017

^{xx} Interview with echo training participants, Chankanai, Jaffna, 10 March, 2017

Annexure

- Questionnaire

- Quantitative Data Analysis

Good morning/afternoon/evening,

You are participating in an evaluation survey conducted on dialogue initiatives implemented by the Office for National Unity & Reconciliation (ONUR) and the Centre for Peace Building and Reconciliation (CPBR). In this survey we would like for you to answer questions based on your experience and personal opinions. It would take about 40 minutes to answer all questions. We will not record your name so no one will know who gave which answer to our questions. There is no risk to you in participating in this survey. There is also no benefit for you in participating in this survey. But if you answer our questions you will help us to understand how the public feels about the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Your assistance in this regard is very much appreciated.

Instructions to Fill the Questionnaire

1. Please try to answer all questions. Each answer is extremely important for this study.
2. Please circle the relevant option to indicate your answer.
3. Unless otherwise specified, please note that all questions are single answer questions.

Demography Section

D1. How old are you?:

D2. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

D3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most?

1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. Muslim
4. UC-Tamil
5. Other

D4. What religious group do you identify with the most?

1. Buddhism
2. Hinduism
3. Islam
4. Roman Catholicism
5. Christianity (Non-RC)
6. Other _____

D5. What is your occupation?

Impact

Section A

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
1. Members of my ethnic group should not marry individuals from other ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	98	99
2. Due to mixing of various cultures, my [ethnic/religious group] is threatened of losing its cultural identity	1	2	3	4	98	99
3. My ethnic identity is important when working with government institutions as it makes it easier to obtain services	1	2	3	4	98	99
4. I feel uncomfortable when I am around a significant number of people who speak a different language	1	2	3	4	98	99

5. Of the following statements, which do you most agree with?

1. For a person what is important is only the national identity
2. For a person, both ethnic and national identities are equally important
3. For a person, national identity is important, but ethnic identity is more important
4. For a person, ethnic identity is always more important than the national identity

Section B

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
6. I would like to live in a neighbourhood with mostly people from my own ethnicity	1	2	3	4	98	99
7. I can live with any other ethnic/religious group the same way I would live with my own	1	3	4	6	98	99
8. I feel uncomfortable when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds speak their language around me	1	2	3	4	98	99
9. I don't feel comfortable living in a neighbourhood with mostly people from other ethnicities	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section C

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
10. Even if the opportunity is available, it is difficult to forge meaningful friendships with members of other religious groups	1	2	3	4	98	99
11. Sometimes it would be better to be cautious when interacting with people from other ethnic groups	1	3	4	6	98	99
12. When thinking of other ethnic groups, I think they mostly trust their own members	1	2	3	4	98	99

13. Even if the opportunity is available, it is difficult to forge meaningful friendships with members of other ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	98	99
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Section D

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
14. I seek opportunities to speak with individuals of other racial or ethnic backgrounds about their life experiences	1	2	3	4	98	99
15. I am not likely to participate in events organized by another ethnic group	1	3	4	6	98	99
16. I am not hesitant to express my concern about discrimination to people from other racial or ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	98	99
17. I don't understand why people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds wear clothes that distinguish their identity	1	2	3	4	98	99

18. Do you have any friends from other ethnicities?

1. Yes
2. No

19. If yes, how many friends do you have from other ethnicities?

.....

Section E

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
20. The history of an ethnic/religious community is not relevant when it comes to the rights they are entitled to enjoy	1	2	3	4	98	99
21. The three decade war affected not only my ethnic community, but also other ethnic communities	1	3	4	6	98	99
22. No preferential treatment should be given to any ethnic group	1	2	3	4	98	99
23. Open discussion of sensitive historical incidents is necessary for a true and meaningful process of building better relationships between ethnic groups in the country	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section F

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
24. Reconciliation attempts are not useful because I don't believe positive relationships can be developed between ethnic communities	1	3	4	6	98	99
25. It is not necessary for the general public to get involved in reconciliation led by politicians	1	2	3	4	98	99
26. It is not interpersonal understanding that matters for building positive ethnic relationships but a proper constitution	1	2	3	4	98	99

27. How necessary are the below four factors to enable reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

		Very necessary	Necessary	Not necessary	Not necessary at all	Don't know/can't say
A	Revealing the truth about the crimes that allegedly took place during war time	1	2	3	4	98
B	Delivering justice to those who faced injustices during war time	1	2	3	4	98
C	Letting go of the bitter memories related to the war	1	2	3	4	98
D	Forgiving the wrong doings of each other that occurred during the war	1	2	3	4	98

Section G

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
28. People have different qualities based on their ethnic identity	1	2	3	4	98	99
29. In the constitution all religions should be given equal status	1	3	4	6	98	99
30. Future changes in the composition of the population can be problematic to harmony	1	2	3	4	98	99
31. It is necessary to have the involvement of religious leaders in politics	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section H

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
32. No reconciliation process would heal the suffering of the war affected people	1	2	3	4	98	99
33. It is acceptable for someone to blame other ethnic communities due to their personal experiences during the war	1	3	4	6	98	99
34. People will be able to come out of their psychological suffering with the help of financial compensation	1	2	3	4	98	99
35. My ethnic group has suffered the most in past conflicts/mass violence	1	2	3	4	98	99
36. My ethnic group was the most discriminated against in the past	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer

Section I

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
37. It is important for Sri Lanka to continue as a unitary state	1	2	3	4	98	99
38. My ethnic group has a shared history in this country along with other ethnic groups	1	3	4	6	98	99
39. Sri Lanka is capable of creating positive relationships between its ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	98	99
40. The security/position of my ethnic group will decline as a result of creating better relationships between different ethnic groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section J

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
41. I approve of the practice of singing the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil	1	2	3	4	98	99
42. Minorities should have constitutional guarantees to protect their rights	1	3	4	6	98	99
43. It is important to have representatives from my own ethnic group in parliament	1	2	3	4	98	99
44. It is important for the politician to promote only his/her own ethnicity	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section K

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
45. The security/position of my ethnic group will improve as a result of the reconciliation process	1	2	3	4	98	99
46. Sri Lanka needs involvement from outside actors in creating positive relationships between its ethnic groups	1	3	4	6	98	99
47. I believe the behaviour of certain ethnic/religious communities is detrimental to the reconciliation of the country	1	2	3	4	98	99
48. Reconciliation is not really	1	2	3	4	98	99

necessary; it is something imposed by the West on Sri Lanka						
49. I believe that the resources of the country are fairly distributed among all ethnic communities	1	2	3	4	98	99
50. I believe that my ethnic identity has no effect on my job opportunities	1	2	3	4	98	99

Section L

On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=strongly agree, and 6=strongly disagree, to what extent do you agree with the following?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DKNS	Refuse to answer
51. It is my ethnicity that has a historical right to this country	1	2	3	4	98	99
52. Using violence to protect the legacy of my ethnicity can be approved	1	3	4	6	98	99
53. My ethnic groups has certain characteristics which made us superior than other	1	2	3	4	98	99
54. There are instance where I get anger towards other ethnic groups due to the things that I heard about their behaviour	1	2	3	4	98	99

55. How much are you aware of the reconciliation process in the country?

1. Very much aware
2. Somewhat aware
3. I know it only by the name
4. I haven't heard about it at all

56. If you are very much or somewhat aware, what do you think is the possibility of Sri Lanka achieving true reconciliation on a scale of 0-10 where 0 is impossible and 10 is absolutely possible?

Impossible

Absolutely possible

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

57. Would you tell me how much you know about the following:

How much do you know about the...	I have a lot of knowledge	I have a fair amount of knowledge	I have little knowledge	No knowledge at all
1. Ethnic groups in Sri Lanka	1	2	3	4
2. Religious groups in Sri Lanka	1	2	3	4
3. Cultural practices of the Sinhalese	1	2	3	4
4. Cultural practices of the Tamils	1	2	3	4
5. Cultural practices of the Muslims	1	2	3	4
6. Religious practices of the Buddhists	1	2	3	4
7. Religious practices of the Hindus	1	2	3	4
8. Religious practices of the Muslims	1	2	3	4
9. Religious practices of the Christians	1	2	3	4
10. National heroes of the Sinhalese community	1	2	3	4
11. National heroes of the Tamil community	1	2	3	4
12. National heroes of the Muslim community	1	2	3	4

Implementation

58. Have you ever taken part in any kind of reconciliation programme apart from the Interfaith & Inter-cultural Dialogues conducted by ONUR/CPBR?

1. Yes
2. No

59. Please choose from the list below:

1. Twinning school programmes
2. Sports events
3. Inter-cultural events
4. Inter-faith celebrations
5. LLRC hearing

6. Missing Persons Commission

7. Other

Please specify:

60. What phase of the Interfaith & Inter-cultural Dialogues conducted by ONUR/CPBR did you participate in?

1. As a participant in the one day programme
2. As a designer of a community initiative
3. As a participant of a community initiative
4. Other.....

61. Were you briefed about the programme before you participated?

1. We were well briefed about what this programme aimed to do
2. We had some idea about what this programme aimed to do
3. We did not receive any information about the programme
4. I do not remember

62. How satisfied are you with the way people were selected for the programme?

1. Very Satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very Dissatisfied

63. How do you assess the quality of the Interfaith & Inter-cultural Dialogues conducted by ONUR/CPBR on the following counts?

	Good	Moderate, but could improve	Bad	Not relevant
1.Content of the programme	1	2	3	9
2. Facilities provided at the one day programme (food and venue)	1	2	3	9
3. Performance of the facilitator	1	2	3	9
4. Community Initiative	1	2	3	9
5.The exposure you received – such as the lives and experiences of other communities	1	2	3	9

64. To what extent did the programme influence the thinking pattern/attitudes of yours?

- 1. To a great extent
- 2. To some extent
- 3. Nothing changed

65. If your answer is 1 or 2 in what ways did your attitudes change?

.....

.....

.....

66. What were the three things that you liked most about the programme?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

67. What were the three things that you liked least about the programme?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

68. Do you recommend this programme to be implemented in other areas of the country?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

69. If yes what are your suggestions for improvement of the programme?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

70. If no, why do you think so?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

We greatly appreciate your cooperation extended to us by answering this questionnaire.

Quantitative Data Analysis

1. Members of my ethnic group should not marry individuals from other ethnic groups * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	34.3%	44.4%
Disagree	65.7%	55.6%
Base	105	45

2. Due to mixing of various cultures, my [ethnic/religious group] is threatened of losing its cultural identity * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	53.7%	65.3%
Disagree	46.3%	34.7%
Base	108	49

3. My ethnic identity is important when working with government institutions as it makes it easier to obtain services * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	48.1%	48.9%
Disagree	51.9%	51.1%
Base	108	45

4. I feel uncomfortable when I am around a significant number of people who speak a different language * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	67.6%	66.7%
Disagree	32.4%	33.3%
Base	102	45

5. Of the following statements, which do you most agree with? * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	85.3%	86.0%
Disagree	14.7%	14.0%
Base	109	57

6. I would like to live in a neighbourhood with mostly people from my own ethnicity * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	70.5%	71.7%
Disagree	29.5%	28.3%
Base	112	53

7. I can live with any other ethnic/religious group the same way I would live with my own * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	72.1%	64.3%
Disagree	27.9%	35.7%
Base	104	56

8.I feel uncomfortable when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds speak their language around me * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	60.4%	57.5%
Disagree	39.6%	42.5%
Base	101	40

9.I don't feel comfortable living in a neighbourhood with mostly people from other ethnicities * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	48.5%	55.3%
Disagree	51.5%	44.7%
Base	103	38

10. Even if the opportunity is available, it is difficult to forge meaningful friendships with members of other religious groups

	Test	Control
Agree	15.5%	37.5%
Disagree	84.5%	62.5%
Base	103	40

11.Sometimes it would be better to be cautious when interacting with people from other ethnic groups * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	62.2%	69.8%
Disagree	37.8%	30.2%
Base	111	53

12.When thinking of other ethnic groups, I think they mostly trust their own members * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	71.4%	67.9%
Disagree	28.6%	32.1%
Base	105	53

13. Even if the opportunity is available, it is difficult to forge meaningful friendships with members of other ethnic groups

	Test	Control
Agree	18.4%	25.6%
Disagree	81.6%	74.4%
Base	98	43

14.I seek opportunities to speak with individuals of other racial or ethnic backgrounds about their life experiences * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	77.4%	70.2%
Disagree	22.6%	29.8%
Base	106	57

15.I am not likely to participate in events organized by another ethnic group * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	24.5%	33.3%
Disagree	75.5%	66.7%
Base	94	36

16.I am not hesitant to express my concern about discrimination to people from other racial or ethnic groups * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	87.9%	80.4%
Disagree	12.1%	19.6%
Base	107	56

17.I don't understand why people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds wear clothes that distinguish their identity * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	24.2%	27.9%
Disagree	75.8%	72.1%
Base	99	43

18.Do you have any friends from other ethnicities? * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	85.3%	77.2%
Disagree	14.7%	22.8%
Base	109	57

19. If yes, how many friends do you have from other ethnicities?

	Test	Control
1-5	46.5%	59.1%
6-10	16.2%	11.4%
11-15	9.1%	4.5%
16-20	5.1%	4.5%
21-50	7.1%	15.9%
51and above	16.2%	4.5%
Base	99	44

20. The history of an ethnic/religious community is not relevant when it comes to the rights they are entitled to enjoy * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	73.2%	69.6%
Disagree	26.8%	30.4%
Base	97	46

21.The three decade war affected not only my ethnic community, but also other ethnic communities * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	92.7%	91.1%
Disagree	7.3%	8.9%
Base	110	56

22.No preferential treatment should be given to any ethnic group * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	61.7%	72.3%
Disagree	38.3%	27.7%
Base	94	47

23. Open discussion of sensitive historical incidents is necessary for a true and meaningful process of building better relationships between

	Test	Control
Agree	79.3%	87.5%
Disagree	20.7%	12.5%
Base	111	56

24. Reconciliation attempts are not useful because I don't believe positive relationships can be developed between ethnic communities

	Test	Control
Agree	23.7%	38.5%
Disagree	76.3%	61.5%
Base	93	39

25.It is not necessary for the general public to get involved in reconciliation led by politicians * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	32.6%	33.3%
Disagree	67.4%	66.7%
Base	89	42

26.It is not interpersonal understanding that matters for building positive ethnic relationships but a proper constitution * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	30.5%	50.0%
Disagree	69.5%	50.0%
Base	95	42

27_1 Revealing the truth about the crimes that allegedly took place during war time * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	77.6%	79.2%
Disagree	22.4%	20.8%
Base	107	53

27_2 Delivering justice to those who faced injustices during war time * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	97.2%	98.2%
Disagree	2.8%	1.8%
Base	109	56

27_3 Letting go of the bitter memories related to the war * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	74.5%	78.0%
Disagree	25.5%	22.0%
Base	102	50

27_4 Forgiving the wrong doings of each other that occurred during the war * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	88.2%	75.6%
Disagree	11.8%	24.4%
Base	110	45

28. People have different qualities based on their ethnic identity * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	89.2%	85.7%
Disagree	10.8%	14.3%
Base	111	56

29. In the constitution all religions should be given equal status * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	83.3%	87.3%
Disagree	16.7%	12.7%
Base	108	55

30. Future changes in the composition of the population can be problematic to harmony * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	60.4%	55.8%
Disagree	39.6%	44.2%
Base	91	43

31. It is necessary to have the involvement of religious leaders in politics * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	56.5%	57.9%
Disagree	43.5%	42.1%
Base	92	38

32. No reconciliation process would heal the suffering of the war affected people * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	57.8%	59.2%
Disagree	42.2%	40.8%
Base	102	49

33. It is acceptable for someone to blame other ethnic communities due to their personal experiences during the war * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	18.3%	26.2%
Disagree	81.7%	73.8%
Base	93	42

34. People will be able to come out of their psychological suffering with the help of financial compensation * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	15.6%	40.9%
Disagree	84.4%	59.1%
Base	96	44

35. My ethnic group has suffered the most in past conflicts/mass violence * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	41.0%	79.6%
Disagree	59.0%	20.4%
Base	100	54

36. My ethnic group was the most discriminated against in the past * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	33.3%	71.2%
Disagree	66.7%	28.8%
Base	96	52

37. It is important for Sri Lanka to continue as a unitary state * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	78.7%	78.4%
Disagree	21.3%	21.6%
Base	89	37

38. My ethnic group has a shared history in this country along with other ethnic groups * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	91.0%	85.7%
Disagree	9.0%	14.3%
Base	111	56

39. Sri Lanka is capable of creating positive relationships between its ethnic groups * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	85.4%	70.8%
Disagree	14.6%	29.2%
Base	103	48

40. The security/position of my ethnic group will decline as a result of creating better relationships between different ethnic groups * Version

	Test	Control
Agree	29.5%	31.6%
Disagree	70.5%	68.4%
Base	88	38

41.I approve of the practice of singing the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	69.6%	79.6%
Disagree	30.4%	20.4%
Base	102	54

42.Minorities should have constitutional guarantees to protect their rights * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	86.4%	87.3%
Disagree	13.6%	12.7%
Base	103	55

43.It is important to have representatives from my own ethnic group in parliament * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	84.0%	85.2%
Disagree	16.0%	14.8%
Base	106	54

44.It is important for the politician to promote only his/her own ethnicity * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	40.2%	61.2%
Disagree	59.8%	38.8%
Base	102	49

45.The security/position of my ethnic group will improve as a result of the reconciliation process * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	61.0%	75.9%
Disagree	39.0%	24.1%
Base	100	54

46.Sri Lanka needs involvement from outside actors in creating positive relationships between its ethnic groups * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	45.0%	56.6%
Disagree	55.0%	43.4%
Base	109	53

47.I believe the behaviour of certain ethnic/religious communities is detrimental to the reconciliation of the country * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
--	------	---------

Agree	81.3%	80.8%
Disagree	18.7%	19.2%
Base	107	52

48.Reconciliation is not really necessary; it is something imposed by the West on Sri Lanka * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	18.8%	32.3%
Disagree	81.2%	67.7%
Base	85	31

49.I believe that the resources of the country are fairly distributed among all ethnic communities * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	57.0%	61.5%
Disagree	43.0%	38.5%
Base	93	39

50.I believe that my ethnic identity has no effect on my job opportunities * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	70.2%	69.6%
Disagree	29.8%	30.4%
Base	104	46

51.It is my ethnicity that has a historical right to this country * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	36.8%	53.3%
Disagree	63.2%	46.7%
Base	95	45

52.Using violence to protect the legacy of my ethnicity can be approved * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	6.8%	18.8%
Disagree	93.2%	81.3%
Base	88	32

53.My ethnic groups has certain characteristics which made us superior than other * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	36.0%	51.1%
Disagree	64.0%	48.9%
Base	100	45

54. There are instance where I get anger towards other ethnic groups due to the things that I heard about their behaviour * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Agree	50.5%	55.1%

Disagree	49.5%	44.9%
Base	107	49

55.How much are you aware of the reconciliation process in the country? * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
Very much a	17.1%	23.2%
Somewhat a	75.7%	60.7%
I know it onl	3.6%	16.1%
I haven't hea	3.6%	.0%
Base	111	56

56.If you are very much or somewhat aware, what do you think is the possibility of Sri Lanka achieving true reconciliation on a scale of 0-10

	Test	Control
0	3.0%	2.2%
1	1.0%	.0%
2	2.0%	8.7%
3	9.9%	8.7%
4	6.9%	8.7%
5	25.7%	15.2%
6	7.9%	4.3%
7	7.9%	10.9%
8	5.0%	8.7%
9	4.0%	2.2%
10	26.7%	30.4%
Base	101	46

57_1.Ethnic groups in Sri Lanka * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
I have a lot d	41.8%	35.1%
I have a fair	50.0%	54.4%
I have little k	8.2%	7.0%
No knowled	.0%	3.5%
Base	110	57

57_2.Religious groups in Sri Lanka * Version Crosstabulation

	Test	Control
I have a lot d	50.9%	33.3%
I have a fair	46.3%	57.9%
I have little k	1.9%	7.0%
No knowled	.9%	1.8%
Base	108	57

58. Have you ever taken part in any kind of reconciliation programme apart from the Interfaith & Inter-cultural Dialogues conducted by

	Test	Control
Yes	37.0%	43.9%

No	63.0%	56.1%
Base	108	57

59. Please choose from the list below:

	Test	Control
Twinning sch	.0%	8.0%
Sports event	35.0%	40.0%
Inter-cultural	52.5%	44.0%
Inter-faith co	32.5%	16.0%
LLRC hearing	7.5%	12.0%
Missing Pers	10.0%	4.0%
Other	22.5%	20.0%
Base	40	25

60. What phase of the Interfaith & Inter-cultural Dialogues conducted by ONUR/CPBR did you participate in?

	Test
As a particip	85.7
As a designe	3.8
As a particip	10.5
Base	105

61. Were you briefed about the programme before you participated?

	Test
We were we	36.0
We had som	37.7
We did not r	14.9
I do not rem	3.5
DK/NS	7.9
Base	114

Q63_1 1. Content of the programme

	Test
Good	34.2
Moderate, b	47.4
Bad	7.9
Not relevant	0.9
DK/NS	9.6
Base	114

Q63_2 2. Facilities provided at the one day programme (food and venue)

	Test
Good	45.6
Moderate, b	36
Bad	0.9
Not relevant	8.8

DK/NS	8.8
Base	114

Q63_3 3.Performance of the facilitator

	Test
Good	57.9
Moderate, b	31.6
Bad	0.9
DK/NS	9.6
Base	114

Q63_4 4.Community Initiative

	Test
Good	13.2
Moderate, b	45.6
Bad	7
Not relevant	26.3
DK/NS	7.9
Base	114

Q63_5 5.The exposure you received – such as the lives and experiences of other communities

	Test
Good	25.4
Moderate, b	57.9
Bad	5.3
Not relevant	0.9
DK/NS	10.5
Base	114

64. To what extent did the programme influence the thinking pattern/attitudes of yours?

	Test
To a great e	21.1
To some ext	60.5
Nothing cha	11.4
DK/NS	7.0
Base	114

68. Do you recommend this programme to be implemented in other areas of the country?

	Test
Yes	80.7
No	8.8
DK/NS	10.5
Base	114




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Dr. Pradeep Peiris

82/47A, 14th Lane,

Wickramasinghepura

Battaramulla, Sri Lanka

pnpeiris@gmail.com

+94 773 622 575